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Abstract This paper presents a structural labour supply model for the Netherlands.
The model uses a large, rich data set which allows for precise estimates of labour
supply elasticities for several subgroups. We use an advanced tax benefit calculator
to calculate households’ budget constraints accurately. Both the large, rich data set
and the advanced tax benefit calculator enable us to perform more accurate policy
predictions. Simulations show that labour supply elasticities differ among subgroups.
Labour supply elasticities for men in couples are low but labour supply elasticities are
much higher for cohabiting/married women. Furthermore, elasticities are relatively
high for individuals with a lower education and/or non-Western background. Policy
simulations provide two important insights. First, an introduction of either a pure flat
tax, or an income-neutral flat tax, decreases aggregate labour supply. Second, an EITC
for working parents is more effective in stimulating aggregate labour supply than an
EITC for all workers or an overall reduction in marginal tax rates.
Keywords Discrete choice models · Labour supply · Simulated maximum
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1 Introduction
An ageing population and the great recession impose challenges for the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. An important way to retain fiscal sustainability is to increase
labour force participation. Over the past decade, the Dutch government proposed sev-
eral reforms on earned income tax credits (EITCs) in order to stimulate labour force
participation. In addition, there has been an ongoing discussion on the desirability of a
flat tax rate in the Netherlands. There is an extensive international literature on labour
supply effects of EITCs (Brewer et al. 2006; Eissa and Hoynes 2004) but these studies
do not compare the relative effectiveness of EITCs targeted at several subgroups. It is
important to know which EITC is most promising in boosting employment. A flat tax
has often been topic of economic research as well (Aaberge et al. 2000; Fuest et al.
2008) but these studies do not estimate labour supply responses for several subgroups
separately. However, in order to assess these reforms, it is crucial to have a thorough
understanding of how several subgroups respond to financial incentives.
We use a discrete choice model (Van Soest 1995) for labour supply to analyze
several tax reforms in the Netherlands. The main advantage of discrete choice models
is their ability to copewith budget constraints that are highly nonlinear and non-convex
due to the tax and benefit system. For that reason, discrete choicemodels are often used
to evaluate ex-ante labour supply effects of policy measures.1 We use large, rich data
from the Netherlands Housing Research WOON for 2005 (In Dutch:Woononderzoek
Nederland) to estimate preferences over income and leisure for several subgroups,
and to simulate tax benefit reforms targeted at specific subgroups.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that labour supply elasticities differ
across subgroups. Labour supply elasticities are relatively low for men but relatively
high for women. Furthermore, individuals with a lower education and/or non-Western
background have a relatively high labour supply elasticity. This is mostly due to
differences in participation rate among these subgroups. The response at the extensive
margin (i.e. participation) is more important than the reponse at the intensive margin
(i.e. hours per employed). Second, the recent reform on EITC for working parents with
a youngest child up to 12years of age increases labour supply. The Dutch government
raised the level, and the income dependency, of this EITC in the period 2006–2009.
Third, an EITC for working parents is more effective in stimulating labour supply than
an EITC for all workers or an overall reduction of marginal tax rates. The reason for
this is that an EITC for working parents is targeted at secondary earners/single parents
who are relatively elastic with respect to labour supply. Finally, simulation results
show that both a pure flat tax, with increasing income equality, and an income-neutral
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) flat tax decrease labour supply.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. We use a rich, large
data set enabling us to estimate several subgroups separately.We have 34,183 individu-
als in our data set and estimate utility functions separately for singles without children,
single parents, couples without children and couples with children.2 This makes our
1 Creedy et al. (2002) provide a nice technical survey of behavioural microsimulation.
2 Which corresponds to 20,641 households.
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estimation more flexible and precise. Many related studies focus on a single group
(e.g. Blau and Kahn 2007) or pool subgroups due to the low number of observations
(e.g. Bargain et al. 2014). Estimation results show that labour supply elasticities differ
among subgroups. This level of detail enables us to perform highly accurate policy
simulations. Another contribution is that the labour supply model is based on a highly
advanced tax benefit calculator MICROS, which calculates households’ budget con-
straints very accurately.3 By contrast, most labour supply studies are based on tax
benefit models with a more simplified tax and social security system. An example is
the study by Van Soest and Das (2001). InMICROS, the tax and social security system
is modelled in much more detail enabling more accurate policy simulations. MICROS
uses a detailed and comprehensive gross / net module that takes pension contributions,
social security contributions, tax credits, wealth, health insurance premiums, tax ben-
efits of many tax deductions (for instance mortgage interests, health costs) and several
means tested benefits (such as subsidies for rents and healthcare costs) into account.
Hence, the budget constraint is based on more detailed information on income than
for instance the EU-SILC data set which is used by Bargain et al. (2014). Finally, this
study also has relevance for the current policy debate in the Netherlands. Recently
there was much debate, among politicians and in the media, about the employment
effects of the government’s new tax plan for 2016. The aim of the tax plan is to create
more employment by reducing the tax burden on labour with 5 billion euro.4 Important
policymeasures in the tax plan are (1) a reduction in themarginal tax rates, (2) a higher
EITC for all workers and (3) a higher EITC for working parents. This paper compares
the relative effectiveness of these policy measures in stimulating labour supply.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying theory of
the labour supply model. Section 3 describes the dataset and Sect. 4 describes the tax
system in the Netherlands. Section 5 discusses estimation results and labour supply
elasticities. Labour supply effects of several tax reforms are presented in Sect. 6.
Section 7 concludes. Additional information can be found in the Appendices.
2 Structural Model
This section sets out the structural labour supply model. The model does not only
focus on the decision of individuals to work more or less (intensive margin) but also
on the decision to participate or not (extensive margin). For non-working individuals
we do not observe wage rates in the sample and we have to estimate these wages.
“Appendix 1” describes the theory and estimation results of the wage estimation.
Starting point of the analysis is an individual who maximizes utility with respect
to leisure and income, taking a budget constraint into account. The budget constraint
3 Adrawback of the analysis is that the estimation is on a cross section data setwhichmay raise identification
issues. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that our simulated labour supply effects of the reform on
EITCs for working parents are of the same magnitude as the results found by a difference-in-difference
study by Bettendorf et al. (2012) on the same reform.
4 Available online (in Dutch) at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2015/06/19/
belastingherziening.
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is as follows5:
y = y(wh, ynon) = y(w(80 − l), ynon) (1)
Income (y) equals the product of net wage (w) and labour supply (h) added to non-
labour income (ynon), such as income from wealth and family allowances. Here,
the following time restriction holds: h + l =80, where l represents hours of leisure
per week.6 An individual chooses a combination of income (y) and leisure (l) that
maximizes utility. We use the following log quadratic utility function, where income
and leisure are in natural logarithms:
U (y, l) = u(y, l) + 
= α1ln2(y) + α2ln2(ls) + α3ln(y)ln(ls) + α4ln(y) + (α5 + βX + μ)ln(ls)
+ (α6 + γ X) f cs +  (2)
with s = {male, f emale}. Total utilily, U (y, l), consists of a deterministic term,
u(y, l), and an error term () drawn from an extreme value distribution (McFadden
1978). An advantage of the log quadratic utility function is its flexibility.7
The utility function contains terms for income and leisure and several interaction
terms. We allow the preference for leisure to vary over observable characteristics X
like age and the presence of (young) children. We include a quadratic term for age
since we expect that the relationship between age and the preference for leisure is
not constant. The utility function also includes fixed costs of work ( f cs), for men
and women separately. We include fixed costs of work as indicator variables8 and
interact them with observable characteristics (X ) such as education, ethnicity and
region. The fixed costs specification provides us with a better prediction of the labour
supply distribution (Euwals and Van Soest 1999). Finally, the utility function takes
unobserved heterogeneity (μ) with respect to the preference of leisure into account.
An individual chooses from a discrete choice set L ∈ {L = 1, . . . J }. Individuals
choose from 6 labour supply options (0, 8, 16, 24, 32 or 40h of work)9 and individual
i prefers labour supply option k if utility in k is higher than the utility of all other
alternatives:
pki = P(Uki > Uji ) = P(uki − u ji >  ji − ki ) (3)
i = 1, . . . N individuals, j = 1, . . . J alternatives and k = 1, . . . J alternatives
(k = j). The error terms () follow an extreme value distribution. McFadden (1974)
showed that in this case the probability for alternative k, pki , for individual i equals:
5 The gross wage is considered fixed throughout the analysis, which is a common assumption in discrete
choice labour supply models. See for instance Creedy and Kalb (2005).
6 Experimentation with other time endowments hardly affected the results.
7 Sensitivity analysis shows that the choice of the functional form hardly affects the results (see “ Appendix
5”).
8 Which equal zero for the non-working alternative and one for all the working alternatives.
9 Discretized as 0=[0,5], 8=[6,13], 16=[14,20], 24=[21,27], 32=[28,34], 40=[35,.).
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The additional random term μ for unobserved heterogeneity in Eq. 2 complicates
the estimation. In addition, we estimate wages for non-workers in our sample (see
“Appendix 1”) and take R draws from the wage distribution. The likelihood function
has no closed form solution and therefore we use simulated maximum likelihood. For
each draw of the random term μ we calculate the likelihood and then take the average















We use Halton sequences to draw the random terms. They provide better coverage of
the distribution than pseudo-random draws for finite samples (Train 2003).11
3 Data
We use data from the Netherlands Housing Research WOON (In Dutch: Woononder-
zoek Nederland) for 2005. WOON is a large representative Dutch housing survey.12
Our data set is supplemented with administrative income data from the Dutch Tax
Office. The survey contains approximately 65,000 households. Besides general infor-
mation such as age, education, ethnicity, presence of children and the number of
working hours, gross income of all household members is known as well. Further-
more, gross income is known for different sources of income, such as wages, profits
and various benefits (including social assistance, unemployment benefits, disability
benefits and pensions). In addition, the survey also contains information about wealth,
rent, mortgages, health care expenditures and several tax deductions (including med-
ical expenses and interest paid on mortgages).
We include individuals between 23 and 60years of age. Self-employed individuals
and their partners are excluded from our sample since their number of working hours
is unknown. Gross income is observed in the sample and hourly wages of workers
are calculated by dividing gross annual labour income and working hours per week.
We also exclude individuals with multiple sources of income (for example wages
and profits) since their budget constraint is too complex. Non-working individuals
are included in the sample, but only if they receive social assistance or no income.
Individuals with unemployment benefits are not included in the sample since we do
not have information on job search behaviour and therefore cannot identify whether
10 The simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator is consistent if N (number of individuals) and R
(number of draws) tends to infinity. Moreover, if
√
N/R → 0 then the SML estimator is asymptotically
equivalent to the ML estimator (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
11 Haan and Uhlendorf (2006) provide a good description of Stata routines for simulated maximum like-
lihood and Halton draws.
12 The Netherlands Housing Research is a survey that includes information on housing conditions of
households, including housing costs.
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these individuals are involuntary unemployed or not.13 Finally, disabled individuals
are also excluded.14
“Appendix 2” presents descriptive statistics for the subgroups we consider. Here,
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for singles without children and single parents.
We see that non-employed singles are relatively low educated (65.9%), whereas the
share of employed singles with a low education is much lower (33.7%). Furthermore,
non-employed singles are more likely to have a non-Western background (28.9%)
than employed singles (8.4%). A similar pattern arises for single parents. Finally,
the participation rate of single parents is relatively low (58.0%) compared to singles
without children (83.2%).
Table 12 shows descriptive statistics for couples without children. As expected,
mostmen participate on the labourmarket (95.2%) and the average number ofworking
hours is high (36.9 hours per week). Again we see that lower educated individuals and
non-Western immigrants are less likely to participate on the labour market. Table 13
shows that the averagenumber ofworkinghours is lower forwomenwith children (15.7
hours per week in Table 13) than for women without children (22.5 hours per week in
Table 12). In theNetherlands, the average participation rate ofwomen is relatively high
compared to other OECD countries (OECD 2013). However, employed women work
5–10hours perweek less on average compared to otherOECDcountries (OECD2013).
4 Institutional Setting
Labour income is taxed progressively at the individual level in theNetherlands. Table 1
showsmarginal tax rates in 2005.Marginal tax rates increase as taxable personal labour
income increases. The marginal tax rate is 34.4% in the first tax bracket (0–16,893
euro) and rises to 52% in the fourth bracket (>51,672 euro).
The Dutch tax system contains several tax credits and Table 2 illustrates the most
important tax credits. Non-working individuals and employees in the Netherlands are
entitled to a general tax credit of 1894 euro.15 Individuals not paying taxes can transfer
this general tax credit to their spouses.16
The Dutch tax system contains four important EITCs for employees in 2005. First,
an EITC for all workers (irrespective of the presence of young children).17 The level
of this EITC rises with income at a (phase-in) rate of 11.9%, until the maximum of
1287 euro is reached. Second, an EITC for working single parents with a youngest
child up to 16years.18 This EITC rises with personal income at a (phase-in) rate of
13 Here we follow Bargain et al. (2014). Furthermore, De Boer (2015) shows that the role of involuntary
unemployment is limited in the Netherlands in the period 2006–2009.
14 The reason for this is that part of the disabled individuals is permanently disabled, with no prospect of
recovery, and it is not possible to distinguish between permanently or temporarily disabled individuals in
our sample.
15 In Dutch: Algemene heffingskorting.
16 In 2009 the transferability of the general tax credit is stepwise reduced until transferability is completely
abandoned in 2024.
17 In Dutch: Arbeidskorting.
18 In Dutch: Alleenstaande ouderkorting.
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Table 1 Taxation of labour income, 2005
Start End Marginal tax rate
First tax bracket 0 16,893 34.40%
Second tax bracket 16,893 30,357 41.95%
Third tax bracket 30,357 51,762 42%
Fourth tax bracket 51,762 – 52%
Table 2 Tax credits 2005
2005
General tax credit 1894
EITC all workers 1287 / 11.9%
EITC single parents 1401 / 4.3%
EITC primary earners with children 228
EITC secondary earners with
children/single parents
617 (228+389)
4.3% and the maximum EITC equals 1401 euro in 2005. Third, primary earners with
a youngest child up to 12years earn a fixed EITC of 228 euro.19 Fourth, secondary
earners and single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years receive a fixed EITC of
617 euro.20 In order to receive theEITC for primary earners and theEITC for secondary
earners/single parents, personal income must exceed an income threshold 4368 euro.
The Dutch government raised the budget of the EITC for secondary earners by 0.5
billion euro over the period 2006–2009, in order to increase labour force participation
of secondary earners and single parents.
The social security system is complex in the Netherlands. The tax benefit model
MICROS not only calculates taxes and tax credits, but takes pension contributions,
social security contributions, income fromwealth, and health insurance premiums into
account aswell. In additionMICROSdetermines tax benefits of various tax deductions,
like mortgage interests and health care costs, and adds these tax benefits to net income.
Finally, MICROS calculates various means tested benefits such as subsidies for rents.
By taking all relevant elements of the Dutch tax system into account, MICROS cal-
culates budget constraints very accurately. The recent study by Bargain et al. (2014)
uses the tax benefit model EUROMOD to calculate the budget constraints. Although
EUROMOD simulates quite a detailed tax and benefit system for the Netherlands,
it misses important information.21 First, EUROMOD ignores non-take-up of several
benefits, such as rent allowance. Consequently, EUROMODoverestimates the number
of recipients of rent allowance. Second, EUROMOD misses several tax deductions at
the individual level, such as health care costs, study costs and gifts to charities.
19 In Dutch: Combinatiekorting.
20 In Dutch: Aanvullende combinatiekorting.
21 An extensive country report for the Netherlands is available at: https://www.euromod.ac.uk/
using-euromod/country-reports.
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Working hours per week 
Fig. 1 Budget constraint single parent [with a child younger than 12years, gross wage 16euro/h.] Source:
Own calculation with MICROS
Figure 1 shows the non-linear budget constraint for a single parent with an hourly
gross wage of approximately 16 euro. The presence of a child younger than 12years
implies that the single parent receives the EITC (for all workers), the EITC for single
parents and the EITC for secondary earners/single parents.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Singles
We estimate preferences separately for singles without children and single parents.
“Appendix 3” gives the estimated parameters for these subgroups. The number of
observations is 5766 and 1333 for singles without children and single parents, respec-
tively. Estimation results show that the standard deviation of the Halton draws (σ )
for unobserved heterogeneity is not significant and close to zero for both subgroups.
Therefore, we restrict its value to zero in the estimation. Young singles and single par-
ents have a higher preference for work since marginal utility of leisure, with respect
to age, is negative. This relationship is reversed for older singles and the quadratic
term starts to dominate at an age of 32years.22 For single parents, the quadratic term
already dominates at an age of 19years. Females and/or single parents with a youngest
child (0–3years of age) have a higher preference for leisure.
The fixed costs specification contains a constant term and some interaction terms.
The constant term of the fixed costs specification is negative and significantly differ-
ent from zero, which means that there is some disutility from work, such as travelling
22 Since exp(4.419/(2 ∗ 5.382)) ∗ 21 = 32.
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Table 3 Labour supply elasticities singlesa
Singles Single parents
Labour supply 0.19 0.27
(0.02) (0.07)
Extensive margin 0.18 0.26
(0.02) (0.06)
Intensive margin 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
a Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 draws)
costs, search costs or childcare costs.23 Singles and single parents, with a lower edu-
cation and/or a non-Western background, have higher fixed costs of participation. We
also include a dummy for the Western region, which is characterized by relatively
high economic activity, in the fixed costs specification. The coefficient is positive and
significant for single parents.24
An important consideration in our labour supply model is that the quadratic utility
function is not automatically quasi-concave for all values of income (y). This is not a
problem as long as the utility function is quasi-concave for the observed combinations
of income and leisure in the sample. This condition is fulfilled for all singles and single
parents in the sample.
“Appendix 4” shows that the model predicts the labour supply distribution well. We
simulate labour supply elasticities by increasing gross wages by 10%. Table 3 gives
elasticities for singles and single parents with the standard errors between parentheses.
The labour supply elasticity is 0.19 for singles without children which means that
singles increase their labour supply by 0.19 percent as gross wages increase by 1
percent. Single parents are relatively elastic with respect to labour supply: 0.27. The
extensive margin is the increase in the participation rate whereas the intensive margin
refers to change in hours worked by the employed. Table 3 shows that the extensive
margin is more important here.
5.2 Couples
Table 15 in “Appendix 3” contains the parameters of the utility function for couples.We
split the couples into groups without children (5562 households) and with children
(7980 households). Here, we also include a third order term for leisure to improve
the fit of the model in terms of predicting the labour supply distribution. Table 15
illustrates that leisure is a normal good for men and women since the coefficients of
the interaction terms of leisure with income are positive. Marginal utility of income is
positive for all households at the observed labour supply choices. We see that younger
individuals have a higher preference for work (i.e. marginal utility of leisure negative)
23 Childcare costs are not observed in our data set.
24 The dummy is not significant for singles without children and therefore excluded from the regression.
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whereas older individuals have a higher preference for leisure (i.e. marginal utility of
leisure positive).25 The presence of young children (0–4 and 4–11years) raises the
preference for leisure.26
We estimate fixed costs of work separately for men and women. The fixed costs
specification contains a constant term and interaction terms with education, ethnicity
and a dummy for the Western region.27 Fixed costs are higher for men and women
with a lower education and/or non-Western background. Women living in theWestern
region of the Netherlands have lower fixed costs of work. Finally, the estimated stan-
dard deviation of the random terms for leisure are highly significant formen (σ1) but not
for women in couples (σ2). We restrict the standard deviation at zero in the estimation.
Table 4 shows elasticities with the standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities for
men are low. Elasiticities forwomen aremuch higher, 0.39 forwomenwithout children
and 0.51 for women with children. The extensive margin is more important for women
in couples than the intensive margin. Furthermore, cross elasticities are negative and
substantial for women in couples.
“Appendix 5” shows that the results are robust with respect to the functional form of
the utility function. Elasticities for singles, single parents and men and women in cou-
ples are similar whether we use a log linear, quadratic or log quadratic utility function.
We have also experimented with the number of discrete choices and this hardly affects
the results. Estimating nested models, with less interaction terms in the fixed costs
specification or less interactions terms with leisure, does result in higher elasticities
for single parents and women in couples. However, likelihood ratio tests show that
the models in Tables 14 and 15 are preferred over these alternative models. The same
holds for the richest fixed costs specification, where we also include interaction terms
for age and the presence of children (not significant). Finally, “Appendix 5” shows that
calibrating the error terms (Creedy and Kalb 2005) yields similar elasticities. Utility
consists of a deterministic term and a random term. Calibration means that we draw
these random terms from a distribution and only accept those draws for which the
observed outcome has the highest utility.
5.3 Elasticities for Subgroups
It is crucial to have a thorough understanding of how subgroups respond to financial
incentives for an optimal design of the tax benefit system. In the Netherlands for
instance, several EITCs are targeted at specific subgroups (see Sect. 4). We construct
subgroups based on characteristics like age, education and ethnicity and then simulate
elasticities for these subgroups. These subgroups are expected to respond differently
to financial incentives (Bargain et al. 2014). Table 5 gives labour supply elasticities
25 Where the tipping point for men and women without children is at an age of approximately 40 and
41years respectively. For couples with children, the quadratic terms dominates at an age of approximately
35years for men and 36 for women.
26 The reference category is a dummy with the youngest child aged 12years or older.
27 Fixed costs do not differ significantly for lower and higher educated men without children, so we
dropped this interaction term in the fixed costs specification for men without children. The same holds for
the interaction term of the Western region in the fixed costs specification for men.
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Table 4 Wage elasticities couplesa
Couples without children Couples with children
Wage elasticity men (+1%)
Labour supply men 0.07 0.11
(0.01) (0.01)
Extensive margin 0.02 0.09
(0.01) (0.01)
Intensive margin 0.05 0.02
(0.00) (0.01)
Labour supply women −0.06 −0.10
(0.02) (0.02)
Wage elasticity women (+1%)
Labour supply women 0.39 0.51
(0.02) (0.02)
Extensive margin 0.26 0.32
(0.02) (0.01)
Intensive margin 0.12 0.19
(0.01) (0.01)
Labour supply men −0.02 −0.03
(0.01) (0.01)
a Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (200 draws)
by subgroups in our sample. Individuals with a lower education and/or non-Western
backgroundhave relatively high labour supply elasticities compared to individualswith
a higher education andWestern background. These differences are primarily driven by
differences in participation rates. Differentation based on the age of the youngest child
and the individuals’ age gives mixed results. Single parents with preschool children
(0–3years of age) are relatively elastic with respect to labour supply and labour supply
elasticities fall as the youngest child gets older. However, we do not find such a pattern
forwomen in coupleswith children.Labour supply elasticities forwomenwith younger
children are similar to those for women with older children. Finally, older singles and
women in couples without children respond more strongly to an increase in gross
wages than their younger counterparts. For single parents the opposite holds. Single
parents younger than 40years of age have a relatively high labour supply elasticity
compared to older single parents.
5.4 Comparison with Literature
We find that elasticities are low for men in couples but considerably higher for women
in couples, in particular when young children are present. Elasticities of singles and
single parents are in between. Our simulated elasticities are in line with related studies.
However, most studies focus only on couples while this study also estimates behav-
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Table 5 Labour supply elasticities subgroupsa




Men Women Men Women
Total 0.19 0.27 0.07 0.39 0.11 0.51
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Education
Lower education 0.33 0.40 0.08 0.57 0.15 0.61
(0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Higher education 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.31 0.09 0.46
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Ethnicity
Non-Western immigrant 0.47 0.48 0.14 0.50 0.31 0.72
(0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Native/Western immigrant 0.16 0.23 0.07 0.38 0.09 0.49
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Presence of children
Child 0–3years – 0.43 – – 0.12 0.49
(0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
Child 4–11years – 0.30 – – 0.12 0.55
(0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
Child 12–17years – 0.22 – – 0.10 0.48
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
Age
<40years 0.15 0.37 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.51
(0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
≥40years 0.25 0.21 0.07 0.65 0.11 0.51
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
a Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (200 draws)
ioural responses of singles and single parents. A recent study by Bargain et al. (2014)
estimates elasticities for singles, but they have to pool singles and single parents due
to the low number of observations.
Studies by Van Soest and Das (2001) and Nelissen et al. (2005) estimate labour
supply elasticities for cohabiting/married women in the Netherlands. Both studies find
somewhat bigger elasticities for women in couples. However, they use older data in
which the participation rate was relatively high. Participation rates have increased
over time and labour supply elasticities fell. Blau and Kahn (2007) show that labour
supply elasticities for women (in couples) fell from 0.8 in 1980 to 0.4 in 2000. Heim
(2007) finds a similar result. Finally, Bargain et al. (2014) estimate elasticities for
several European countries and the US. They estimate a relatively high elasticity for
women in couples (0.2–0.6 across countries), whereas elasticities for men in couples
are rather low (0.05–0.15 across countries). They show that countries with a relatively
high participation rate have relatively low labour supply elasticities.
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We also find that the extensive margin is more important than the intensive margin
for women in couples and this is in line with other studies (Bargain et al. 2014). Cross
elasticities are negative and substantial for women in couples. The same result is found
by Bloemen (2009, 2010).
6 Policy Simulations
This section presents the results of several policy simulations. Section 6.1 shows labour
supply effects of two recent reforms on tax credits in the Netherlands. Next, Sect. 6.2
considers the effectiveness of several policies to increase labour force participation.
Finally, Sect. 6.3 shows labour supply effects of a possible introduction of a flat tax
system in the Netherlands.
6.1 Recent Reforms of Tax Credits
Over the past decade, the Dutch government took several measures in order to increase
labour force participation. We simulate two important reforms.
The first reform is the reform of the EITC for working parents (in Dutch: Inkomen-
safhankelijke Combinatiekorting). Working parents with a youngest child up to
12years of age, are entitled to this EITC. The Dutch government raised the budget
for this EITC over the period 2006–2009. Here, the level and income dependency of
the EITC is raised and the EITC is targeted only on secondary earners/single parents.
Primary earners do not receive this EITC in 2009.28 Figure 2 shows the structure of the
EITC in 2005 and 2009, where personal taxable income is located on the horizontal
axis and the vertical axis shows the level of the EITC. Starting from an individual
income of 4368 euro, the EITC increases with a rate of 3.8% until the maximum of
1722 euro is reached.29 Calculations with MICROS show that the public expenditures
on the EITC is approximately 1.1 billion euro.30 Approximately 1 out of 7 million
working individuals receive the EITC for working parents.
The second large reform is the removal of the transferability of the general tax
credit (in Dutch: Beperking overdraagbaarheid algemene heffingskorting). Individ-
uals receive a general tax credit of 1894 euro in 2005. Non-working individuals, or
secondary earners who do not pay enough taxes, can transfer this tax credit to their
partners. The transferability of the general tax credit reduces the financial incentive
of non-working partners to supply labour. In order to stimulate labour force partici-
pation, the Dutch government restricted this transferability of the general tax credit
in 2007 (Coalition Agreement, 2007). At first in 2009, the transferability was only
reduced for individuals born after 1971 and without young children (0–6years old).
In 2012, the Dutch government reduced the transferability of the general tax credit for
28 In 2005, the EITC is a fixed amount of 228 euro for primary earners and 617 euro for secondary
earners/single parents.
29 Deflated to 2005 prices.
30 MICROS is highly representative for the Dutch population and budgetary calculations are in line with
official statistics by the Dutch Ministry of Finance and Statistics Netherlands.
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a broader group by lowering the age criterion (from 1971 to 1963) and abolishing the
exemption for individuals with young children. The transferability of the tax credit
is reduced in yearly steps in order to smooth negative income effects. The structural
situation in which transferability is completely abandoned is reached in 2024. In that
case, individuals can only cash the individual tax credit if they pay enough taxes.
A budgetary calculation with MICROS shows that the total budget of the transfer-
ability of the general tax credit is 1.9 billion euro in 2005. Approximately 1.2 million
couples (out of 4.1 million couples) transfer the general tax credit to their partner.
A complicating factor here is that the level of social assistance is linked to the net
minimum wage, which in turn takes the general tax credit into account. In fact, the
general tax credit is included twice in the net minimum wage since, under the old
system, this tax credit can be transferred to a partner. In order to prevent inequality
between working individuals (with only 1 general tax credit in the structural situation)
and recipients of social assistance (still with 2 general tax credits in the structural
situation), the Dutch Coalition decided to reduce the extra general tax credit in net
minimum wage in yearly steps as well. For couples, net income of social assistance
falls by 1894 euro (in 2005 prices) in the structural situation. Single parents receive
90% of the net minimum wage, whereas singles without children only receive 70%
of net minimum wage. Consequently, social assistance’s net income falls by 1705 and
1326 euro for single parents and singles without children respectively. MICROS esti-
mates that the Dutch government saves 0.5 billion euro on social assistance’s budget
in the structural situation, deflated to 2005 prices.
Table 6 shows the labour supply effects of both reforms. We present labour supply
effects as percentage changes in working hours. Column (1) shows the effect of the
EITC for working parents. Singles and couples without children are unaffected by
this EITC reform. Single parents increase their labour supply with 1.3% on average,
whereas women in couples increase their labour supply by 3.2%. The reason for this
relatively large response is that a large majority of secondary earners are women.Most
Dutch women work part time (see Figs. 5b, 6b in “Appendix 4”). Policy simulation
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Table 6 Labour supply effects reforms tax credits 2006–2009
EITC working parentsa Transferability of general tax credit
SA fixedb SA lowerc
(1) (2) (3)
Percentage changesd
Singles without children – – 4.8
Extensive margin – – 4.8
Intensive margin – – −0.1
Single parents 1.3 – 9.9
Extensive margin 0.9 – 10.3
Intensive margin 0.3 – −0.3
Couples without children
Men – 0.5 0.7
Extensive margin – 0.5 0.8
Intensive margin – 0.0 −0.1
Women – 3.4 3.8
Extensive margin – 4.1 4.5
Intensive margin – −0.6 −0.7
Couples with children
Men 0.3 0.1 0.8
Extensive margin 0.4 0.2 0.9
Intensive margin −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
Women 3.2 5.7 6.4
Extensive margin 2.6 6.0 6.7
Intensive margin 0.6 −0.3 −0.3
Total effect (in %) 0.5 1.2 3.0
Total effect in FTEs 15,300 38,300 91,500
a The EITC is a fixed amount of 617 euro in the baseline scenario. In the reform, the EITC rises with income
at a rate of 3.8% until the maximum of 1722 euro is reached
b We simulate the structural situation in which the transferability of the general tax credit (1894 euro) is
completely abandoned. We keep the level of social assistance fixed
c We simulate the structural situation in which the transferability of the general tax credit (1894 euro) is
completely abandoned and the level of social assistance falls
d Including zero values for non-participation
shows that the extensive margin is the main driving force behind the increase in the
labour supply of women. The bottom part of Table 6 shows that total labour supply
increases by 0.5% (15,300 FTEs).
Column (2) in Table 6 shows the labour supply effects of the removal of the transfer-
ability of the general tax credit, under the assumption that the level of social assistance
remains fixed. Only couples are affected by this reform. Table 6 shows that men in
couples hardly adjust their labour supply, which is consistent with having a low labour
supply elasticity. More importantly, most men work full time and pay enough taxes
to cash the general tax credit themselves. Labour supply for women in couples with-
out and with children increases by 3.4 and 5.7%, respectively. Again we see that the
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extensive margin is important here. The intensive margin is negative on average which
is due to a composition effect. Women who enter the labour force prefer small part
time jobs, pulling down the average number of working hours. Total labour supply
increases by 1.2% (36,300 FTEs).
As stated earlier, the Dutch government decided to remove the transferability of
the general tax credit in the net minimum wage as well. This lowers the level of social
assistance and strongly increases the financial incentive to supply labour. The final
column in Table 6 shows that the extensive margin increases labour supply further, as
expected. The increase in labour supply is relatively strong for singles. For couples,
labour supply effects are only slightly higher compared to the scenario in which the
level of social assistance is fixed. This is intuitively appealing since the number of sin-
gles with social assistance is relatively high compared to couples: 75% of households
in the sample with social assistance are single. Overall, labour supply increases with
3.0% (91,500 FTEs).
The reform on the EITC for working parents costs 1.1 billion euro ex-ante. Ex-post
budgetary simulations show that the increase in labour supply due to the EITC, raises
tax revenues by 0.2 billion euro. Hence, the EITC costs 1.1 billion euro ex-ante but
only 0.9 billion euro ex-post. Elimination of the transferability of the general tax credit
results in 0.3 billion euro in additional tax revenues, thereby increasing the ex-ante
revenue of 1.9 billion to 2.2 billion euro. By lowering the level of social assistance as
well, the government receives an additional 0.7 billion euro on tax revenues.
6.2 Effectiveness Policies to Promote Labour Force Participation
As in many OECD countries, the Dutch tax system contains many policy schemes
that aim to increase labour force participation. It is important to know which policy
is most effective in stimulating labour supply. We simulate three of these policies to
study their effectiveness. We simulate an ex-ante increase in 0.5 billion euro in each
of these scenarios. We study the following scenarios:
1. An increase in the EITC for working parents from 1722 euro to 2500 euro. The
phase-in rate increases from 3.8 to 9.5%.
2. An increase in the EITC for all workers from 1287 euro to 1387 euro. The phase-in
rate increases from 11.9 to 12.8%.
3. An overall reduction in marginal tax rates. We lower marginal tax rates in all tax
brackets by 0.2% points.
The EITC for working parents focuses on the smallest group because only secondary
earners and single parents, with a youngest child under 12years, receive this EITC.
The more general EITC for all employed individuals focuses on a much larger group.
Primary earners also receive this EITC and the same holds for secondary earners and
single parents without children.
Table 7 shows that the EITC for working parents is more effective in stimulat-
ing labour supply than a more general EITC for all workers. Overall, labour supply
increases by 0.4% which equals approximately 11,300 FTEs. The reason for this is
that the EITC for working parents is targeted at secondary earners (mostly women in
couples) and single parents who are relatively elastic with respect to labour supply. By
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Table 7 Effectiveness policies to stimulate labour participation
EITC working parentsa EITC all workersb Marginal tax ratesc
(1) (2) (3)
Percentage changesd
Singles without children – 0.2 0.1
Extensive margin – 0.2 0.1
Intensive margin – 0.0 0.0
Single parents 0.7 0.1 0.1
Extensive margin 0.4 0.1 0.1
Intensive margin 0.2 0.0 0.0
Couples without children
Men – 0.0 0.0
Extensive margin – 0.0 0.0
Intensive margin – 0.0 0.0
Women – 0.3 0.1
Extensive margin – 0.2 0.1
Intensive margin – 0.1 0.0
Couples with children
Men 0.2 0.1 0.0
Extensive margin 0.2 0.1 0.0
Intensive margin 0.0 0.0 0.0
Women 2.4 0.3 0.1
Extensive margin 1.3 0.2 0.1
Intensive margin 1.1 0.1 0.1
Total effect (in %) 0.4 0.1 0.1
Total effect in FTEs 11,300 4000 2200
a An increase in the EITC for working parents from 1722 euro to 2500 euro. The phase-in rate increases
from 3.8 to 9.5%
b An increase in the EITC for all workers from 1287 euro to 1387 euro. The phase-in rate increases from
11.9 to 12.8%
c We lower marginal tax rates in all tax brackets by 0.2% points
d Including zero values for non-participation
contrast, the EITC for all workers is also targeted at primary earners who are relatively
inelastic with respect to labour supply. The EITC for all workers (4000 FTEs) is more
effective than an overall reduction in marginal tax rates (2200 FTEs). The increase in
the EITC is fully targeted at employees whereas pensioners also partly benefit from a
generic decrease in marginal tax rates.
6.3 Labour Supply Effects of a Flat Tax Rate in the Netherlands
The discussion about a flat tax already started by Hall and Rabushka (1986) and
has been running for many years. Nowadays there are several countries with a flat
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tax, mainly in Eastern Europe. Examples are Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
Recently, Bulgaria (in 2008) and Hungary (in 2011) introduced a flat tax while in other
countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, the discussion of the desirability of
introducing a flat tax is on the political agenda. In the Netherlands, there is an ongoing
discussion on the desirability of a flat tax system as well.31 In 2005, the right wing
liberals (VVD) proposed a flat tax system in their election program, andmore recently,
the Christian Democrats (CDA) included a flat tax in their program for the elections
in 2012.
There are several flat tax scenarios possible, ranging from a flat tax that increases
income inequality, to a more ’social’ flat tax that keeps income inequality constant.We
simulate both scenarios. First, we simulate a flat tax rate of 38.3%, which is found to
keep the government budget balanced ex-ante. Second, we simulate an income neutral
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) flat tax of 44.0%where we use the additional tax
receipts to compensate low income households. All individuals, who pay income taxes
in the current system, receive a fixed tax credit (1300 euro) in order to compensate
them for the higher marginal tax rate.
Table 8 shows the labour supply effects of a flat tax of 38.3% in the Netherlands.
Labour supply of singles, with or without children, decreases. For men in couples,
the effect is small and close to zero. The largest effect is found for women in cou-
ples. Overall, labour supply decreases by 0.4% (11,100 FTEs). Income inequality, as
measured by the Gini coefficient, increases by 6.8%.
Men in couples hardly adjust their labour supply.Most men are primary earners and
work full time. The effects are much stronger for singles, single parents and women
in couples. The decline in labour supply is highest for women in couples. Women
without children work 1% less, while labour supply of women with children falls by
1.4%. Here, the response at the extensive margin is more important than the response
at the intensivemargin.Manywomenwork part-time and earn a relatively low income.
Consequently, many women in couples now face a higher tax rate and stop working.
The marginal tax rate for these individuals is higher with the flat tax (38.3%) than in
the current situation (34.4%). The same holds for singles and single parents. However,
there is an opposite effect on the intensive margin for most groups.32 Employees with
a relatively high income, currently paying taxes in the second tax bracket (41.95%)
or higher, now face a lower marginal tax rate. Consequently, they increase the number
of working hours.
The second column of Table 8 shows the effects of the income-neutral flat tax.
Labour supply falls for all groups. Singles without children work 1.4% less and now
we also see a large negative effect at the intensive margin (−0.9%). The marginal tax
rate is much higher now (44.0%) than in the first scenario with the flat tax (38.3%).
Indeed, the marginal tax rate is even higher than the current marginal rate in the third
tax bracket (42.0%). Consequently most employed singles without children now face
a higher marginal tax rate and decrease the number of working hours.
31 See for instance Council of Economic Advisors (2005), Gradus (2009) and Gradus et al. (2012).
32 The only exception here are single parents for which the effect at the intensive margin is negative
(−0.1%).
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Table 8 Labour supply effects of a flat tax
Flat tax Ia Flat tax IIb
(Increasing income inequality) (Income neutral)
(1) (2)
Singles without children −0.5 −1.4
Extensive margin −0.6 −0.4
Intensive margin 0.2 −0.9
Single parents −0.8 −0.5
Extensive margin −0.7 1.5
Intensive margin −0.1 −2.0
Couples without children
Men 0.3 −0.3
Extensive margin −0.1 −0.2
Intensive margin 0.3 −0.1
Women −1.0 −1.7
Extensive margin −1.4 −0.1
Intensive margin 0.5 −1.7
Couples with children
Men 0.0 −0.7
Extensive margin −0.2 −0.5
Intensive margin 0.2 −0.2
Women −1.4 −1.3
Extensive margin −1.8 0.7
Intensive margin 0.4 −2.0
Total effect (in %) −0.4 −1.0
Total effect in FTEs −11,100 −29,700
Income inequality
Gini coefficient 6.8% 0.0%
a A uniform flat tax rate of 38.3%
b A uniform flat tax rate of 44.0% and individuals receive a tax credit of 1300 euro
The response at the intensive margin is also negative for single parents: −2.0%.
However, there is an opposite, positive, effect at the extensive margin (1.5%). With
respect to the response at the extensive margin, it is important to distinguish two
mechanmisms. First, some employees face a highermarginal tax rate and stopworking.
Second, the introduction of the tax credit of 1300 euro raises participation of non-
employed individuals. The tax credit is only granted to individuals with labour income.
At the same time the level of social assistance does not change in this scenario, so the
difference between income fromwork and social assistance becomes larger. Recipients
of social assistance thus have a stronger incentive to enter the labourmarket. This effect
is relatively strong for single parents, because they receive social assistance relatively
frequently (42%).
A similar effect is found for women in couples with children. Approximately 31%
of women is non-employed and the introduction of the tax credit increases their par-
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ticipation rate. However, the negative effect at the intensive margin dominates and
total labour supply falls by 1.3%. For women without children, the response at the
extensive margin is slightly negative, because the share of non-employed women is
lower (26%) than for women with children (31%). This reduces labour supply of
women with children more compared to that of women without children. On balance,
labour supply decreases by 1.0% (29,700 FTEs). Income inequality remains constant
in the scenario and labour supply falls more than in the first scenario with a flat tax.
6.4 Comparison with Literature
There is an extensive international literature on labour supply effects of EITCs (Blun-
dell et al. 2000, 2005; Brewer et al. 2006; Eissa and Hoynes 2004). Blundell et al.
(2000) for instance use a discrete choice model for an ex-ante evaluation of the intro-
duction of the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WTFC) in the UK. They estimate that
replacing the family credit by the more generous WFTC increases labour supply by
about 30,000 individuals. Using a difference-and-differences (DD) approach, Blun-
dell et al. (2005) estimate that the WTFC indeed had a significant positive effect on
labour force participation. The ex-post analysis shows that labour force participa-
tion increased by 25,000–59,000 individuals, depending on the type of dataset used.
Brewer et al. (2006) finds a larger effect: the WFTC attracts approximately 81,000
extra workers. They also use a structural labour supply model to study theWFTC. The
authors conclude that the WFTC leads to an increase in the labour supply of single
mothers and men in couples by respectively 5.1 and 0.8 percentage points. The effect
for women in couples is negative: −0.6 percentage points.
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) study the EITC in the US by using survey data for the
period 1984–1996. The study, however, focuses only on the participation decision of
couples. Herein they use both quasi-experimental method, as a structural model. Both
methods show that the EITC decreases total labour force participation of couples. The
decline in the participation of women is larger than the increase in the participation of
men. The behavioral responses of males are limited: most men already participate and
work full-time. Women react more strongly to financial incentives. But because the
EITC depends on the household income, the EITC effectively subsidizes women to
stay home. For somewomen, entering the labour market results in a lower, or complete
loss, of the EITC.
Our simulated results show that the recent reforms on tax credits increase labour
supply and this result is in line with results found by studies on the same reform.
De Mooij (2008) simulates labour supply effects of the EITC for working parents
and the transferability of the general tax credit with a calibrated, general equilibrium
model for the Netherlands. However, these elasticities are not esimated on micro data.
In fact, the elasticities are based on a meta analysis by Evers et al. (2008) on 32
scientific studies, 6 of which refer to the Netherlands. De Mooij (2008) concludes that
the EITC stimulates labour supply of secondary earners but at the expense of primary
earners’ labour supply. In addition, De Mooij (2008) concludes that a removal of the
transferability of the general tax credit increases labour supply of partners in particular.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that there is a strong response at the extensive margin
123
For Better or for Worse: Tax Reform in the Netherlands 145
and this result is in line with the study by Bosch and Van der Klaauw (2012). They
conclude that marginal tax rates are less important and that women respond more to
changes in tax allowances. Our scenario is similar in the sense that the general tax
credit cannot be transferred to their partners, and consequently individuals only receive
the general tax credit if they pay enough taxes. Finally, Bettendorf et al. (2012) use
a DD-analysis to study labour supply effects of a joint reform on childcare and the
EITC for working parents in the period 2005–2009. They find a total effect of 6.2%
for married/cohabiting women with young children.33
Labour supply effects of a flat tax have often been topic of economic research
(Aaberge et al. 2000; Fuest et al. 2008). Aaberge et al. (2000) use a discrete choice
model in order to simulate labour supply effects of a flat tax rate in Italy, Norway
and Sweden and conclude that a flat tax increases labour supply. Fuest et al. (2008)
use a discrete choice model in order to assess labour supply effects of a flat tax in
Germany. They show that a flat tax system, with a low basic allowance and a low
marginal tax rate, increases total labour supply (by approximately 90,000 FTEs) but
increases income inequality. In this scenario, women’s increased labour supply is at
the expense ofmen’s labour supply. The reason for this is that taxation inGermany is at
the household level, which implies that both spouses face the same effective marginal
tax rate. Consequently, it is often observed that men work full time while women are
not participating at all. An alternative scenario, with a higher flat tax rate and a higher
basic allowance, does not generate a significant change in labour supply and income
inequality.
Until now, labour supply effects of a flat tax in the Netherlands were only simulated
with a general equilibrium model (Jacobs et al. 2009). They simulate two scenarios.
First, a systemwith a relatively lowflat tax rate (38%) that increases total labour supply
by 1%. On the one hand, primary earners and singles face lower marginal tax rates and
increase their labour supply. On the other hand, secondary earners face (on average)
higher marginal taxes rates and lower their labour supply. A similar story holds for
non-working individuals. However, our study finds the opposite effect: labour supply
decreases in our first flat tax scenario. An important difference is that the behavioural
responses of Jacobs et al. (2009) are calibrated while this study estimates behavioural
responses for several subgroups with Dutch data.34 Furthermore, they only model the
extensive margin for women in couples and not for singles and single parents. Second,
Jacobs et al. (2009) simulate a system with a relatively high flat tax rate (43%) in
which income inequality is kept constant. In this case, labour supply falls by 0.3%.
Our analysis confirms the result that an income neutral flat tax lowers labour supply.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a recently developed labour supply model based on the highly
advanced Dutch tax benefit model MICROS. The labour supply model uses a discrete
33 The increase in the budget of the EITC is approximately one third of the increase in the childcare budget.
Assuming that both policies are about equally effective in stimulating labour supply, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation shows that our simulated result is broadly in linewith the result found byBettendorf et al. (2012).
34 The elasticities in Jacobs et al. (2009) are based on a meta study by Evers et al. (2008).
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choice framework and themodel does a good job at predicting the labour supply distri-
bution for several subgroups. By using a large, rich data set we obtain precise estimates
of labour supply repsonses for several subgroups. These heterogeneous responses are
important for the tax reforms we consider.
As a first application, labour supply effects of two recently announced policy mea-
sures are simulated. Both the elimination of the transferability of the general tax credit
and the increase in the EITC for secondary earners/single parents increase labour sup-
ply. In addition, policy simulations show that the EITC for secondary earners/single
parents is more effective in stimulating labour supply than a more general EITC for all
workers. Finally, an introduction of a flat tax, either with increasing income inequality
or an income neutral scenario, is expected to reduce labour supply.
A limitation of this analysis is that we assume that all individuals can freely choose
their preferred alternative from a discrete choice set. In reality, demand side restrictions
may limit these discrete choice sets and individuals may be involuntary unemployed.
However, the analysis by De Boer (2015) shows that the role of involuntary unem-
ployment is limited in the Netherlands, at least for the period 2006–2009. The main
reason for this is that the share of involuntary unemployment is low: approximately
4% in the period 2006–2009.
Another caveat is that the labour supply model is restricted to direct labour supply
effects only. In reality, an increase in labour supply may influence unions bargaining
power thereby changing demand for labour and this effect is not taken into account. In
order to take these effects into account, a general equilibrium model is needed which
is beyond the scope of this study. However, microsimulation models are better able to
demonstrate distributional effects of policy measures. A microsimulation model like
MICROS allows for more heterogeneity, enabling us to focus on several subgroups
based on characteristics such as the presence of children, education and/or ethnicity.
Our key contribution is that we use a labour supply model, based on a large, rich
data set, that allows for more heterogeneity in labour supply responses. Our analysis
indeed shows that these subgroups respond differently to financial incentives. This is
of crucial importance for the reforms we consider.
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Appendix 1: Wage Estimation Heckman Selection Model
Gross wages are unknown for non-working individuals and we impute these wages.
This Appendix describes the theory and estimation results of this wage estimation.
We use the observed wage distribution of workers in the sample. We estimate the
determinants of gross wages for this group and use these results to estimate expected
gross wages for non-working individuals. Here, we have to consider a (possible)
selection effect. The population of workers probably differs from the non-working
population in an unmeasurable way. By using the so-called Heckman selection model
(Heckman 1979), we can correct for potential selection bias. The Heckman selection
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model consists of a wage equation and participation equation. The wage equation for
the natural logarithm of gross hourly wage is as follows.
ln(wi ) = x ′iβ + i (6)
where xi is a vector with several dummies for education, age, age squared, a dummy
for non-Western immigrant and a dummy for the Western region for individual i . The
residuals i are assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2. We
estimate the vector β of the wage equation by OLS.
The participation equation estimates the probability of participation, using a probit
regression:
pi = z′iγ + μi (7)
where zi is a vector with several dummies for education, dummies for the presence
of children, age, age squared, a dummy for non-Western immigrant and a dummy for
the Western region as explanatory variables. The unexplained portion is equal to μi ,
and we assume that μi is (standard) normally distributed. It is expected that individ-
uals with a higher education have a higher probability of participation and receive
higher wages on average. A similar story holds with respect to age. However, the
positive relationship between age and participation (and wages) is expected to weaken
when individuals become older (diminishing returns). Furthermore, dummies for Non-
Western immigrants (negative relationship) andWestern region (positive relationship)
are included as well. Finally, one expects that the presence of children lowers the
probability of participation.
The vector γ (Eq. 7) contains coefficients of the participation equation. The corre-
lation between the two error terms of the wage equation () and participation equation
(μ) equals rho (ρ). That is, rho is the correlation between unobserved determinants
of both equations. If rho is positive, it means that unobserved characteristics are pos-
itively correlated. Talent for instance has a positive effect on the gross wage and the
probability of participation, with a positive rho as a result. If rho is negative, then
there are unobserved characteristics that have a positive impact on participation, but
a negative effect on the gross wage (or vice versa). If rho is equal to 0, then the error
terms are independent and selection bias is not present.
The conditional expected value of the gross hourly wages (that is, provided that the
individual works) can be approximated by:
E[w∗|pi = 1] = x ′iβ + E[i |xi , pi = 1] = x ′iβ + ρσM (8)
where
M = φ(ziγ )/	(ziγ ) (9)
The second term on the right hand side of the equation is the InverseMill’s Ratio. Here
φ is the probability density function whereas 	 represents the cumulative probability
density function. Both functions use the vector of explanatory variables (zi ) as input for
each individual. The participation equation ensures that the effect of the characteristics
(zi ) from the participation equation onwages is taken into account. That is, a correction
is made for selection bias.
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Table 9 Wage estimation results: singles
Men Women
Wage equation
Lower education −0.230*** −0.233***
Age (ln) 4.672*** 1.709***
Age squared (ln) −0.590*** −0.195**
Ethnicity −0.053** −0.038*
Region West 0.089*** 0.065***
Constant −6.423*** −0.923
Participation equation
Lower education −0.475*** −0.666***
Age (ln) 10.255*** 15.152***
Age squared (ln) −1.526*** −2.209***
Ethnicity −0.684*** −0.523***
Region West 0.029 0.136***
Youngest child 0–3years −0.726** −0.903***
Youngest child 4–11years 0.307* −0.521***
Youngest child 12–17years 0.093 −0.263***
Constant −16.029*** −24.792***
rho (ρ) −0.129 −0.265***
sigma (σ ) 0.350*** 0.356***
Log likelihood −3720 −4477
* Significant at 10% level; ** At 5% level and *** at 1% level
The Heckman selection model is estimated separately for single women, single
men, men in couples and women in couples. Table 9 shows the results for the wage
and participation equation for single men and women. Most of the coefficients of the
wage equations for singles are highly significant (at 1% level) and have the expected
sign.
Coefficients of the wage equation are directly interpretable. For instance, the aver-
age wage in the Western region of the Netherland is 9.3% higher than in the rest of
the Netherlands.35 Furthermore, we see that a higher education results in a higher
wage. The relationship between wage and age is positive as well, but diminishing in
age. The quadratic term dominates at an age of 52 and 80 for single men and women
respectively. Finally, we find a negative relationship between wages and ethnicity.
It is important to note that the coefficients of the participation equation are not
directly interpretable. The participation equation is estimated with a probit model,
where the marginal effects are not constant and depend on the level of explanatory
variables. In the participation equation, we see that most coefficients are significant
as well. For single men, the coefficients for older children are not significant. This
is probably due to the low number of observations of men with young children in
35 Which equals exp(0.089).
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Table 10 Wage estimation results: couples
Men Women
Wage equation
Lower education −0.287*** −0.339***
Age (ln) 5.383*** 6.284***
Age squared (ln) −0.660*** −0.852***
Ethnicity −0.218*** −0.159***
Region West 0.083*** 0.083***
Constant −7.980*** −8.930***
Participation equation
Lower education −0.385*** −0.600***
Age (ln) 10.025*** 18.832***
Age squared (ln) −1.295*** −2.711***
Ethnicity −0.861*** −0.587***
Region West 0.070* 0.095***
Youngest child 0–3years −0.013 −0.428***
Youngest child 4–11yearrs −0.100* −0.337***
Youngest child 12–17years −0.112** −0.041
Constant −17.384*** −31.290***
rho (ρ) 0.701*** 0.781***
sigma (σ ) 0.354*** 0.399***
Log Likelihood −6869 −10,520
*Significant at 10% level; **At 5% level and ***at 1% level
the sample. Furthermore, cultural factors may also play an important role. For single
women, coefficients for age of the youngest child have the expected sign: as the
youngest child is older, the probability of participation increases. The relationship
between the probability of participation and age (positive, but declining), ethnicity
(negative) and region (positive) is as expected. The coefficient rho is less than 0, but
not significant for single men. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that unobserved characteristics are not negatively correlated. However, the coefficient
rho is significant for single women at the 1% level.
Table 10 shows the results for the wage and participation equation for couples,
again estimated separately for men and women. Most of the coefficients for couples
are significant and have the expected sign. In the wage estimation for couples we see
that rho significantly differs from 0 for both men and women. Rho’s coefficient is
positive which means that unobservable characteristics have a positive effect on both
wages as well as participation.
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics
See Tables 11, 12 and 13.
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics: singles and single parents
Singles Single parents
All Employed Not employed All Employed Not employed
Lower education 39.1 33.7 65.9 51.8 40.4 67.7
Higher education 60.9 66.3 34.1 48.2 59.6 32.3
No children 100.0 100.0 100.0 – – –
Youngest child 0–3years – – – 16.4 11.4 23.2
Youngest child 4–11years – – – 45.8 44.9 47.1
Youngest child 12–17years – – – 37.8 43.7 29.6
Non-Western immigrant 11.9 8.4 28.9 29.0 18.1 43.9
Other 88.1 91.6 71.2 71.0 81.9 56.1
Western region 52.9 52.5 54.8 53.6 54.2 52.9
Non-Western region 47.1 47.5 45.2 46.4 45.8 47.1
Age 40.1 39.4 43.7 39.7 41.1 37.8
(10.6) (10.4) (10.9) (7.3) (6.7) (7.7)
Male 54.4 55.0 51.3 10.0 13.7 4.8
Female 45.6 45.0 48.7 90.0 86.3 95.2
Employed 83.2 100.0 – 58.0 100.0 –
Not employed 16.8 – 100.0 42.0 – 100.0
Working hours per week 30.4 36.5 – 17.5 30.1 –
(15.0) (6.7) – (16.4) (8.9) –
Number of observations 5766 4799 967 1333 773 560
Table 12 Descriptive statistics: couples without children
Couples men Couples women
All Employed Not employed All Employed Not employed
Lower education 35.5 34.8 49.1 40.8 33.5 67.6
Higher education 64.5 65.2 50.9 59.2 66.5 32.4
No children 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Youngest child
0–3years
– – – – – -
Youngest child
4–11years
– – – – – -
Youngest child
12years
– – – – – –
Non-Western
immigrant
5.7 4.9 21.9 6.4 5.3 10.2
Other 94.3 95.1 78.1 93.6 94.7 89.8
Western region 44.7 44.7 44.5 44.7 45.6 41.4
non-Western region 55.3 55.3 55.5 55.3 54.4 58.6
Age 43.8 (11.3) 43.9 (11.2) 41.3 (11.8) 41.8 (11.4) 40.0 (11.3) 48.2 (9.6)
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Table 12 continued
Couples men Couples women
All Employed Not employed All Employed Not employed
Employed 95.2 100.0 – 74.0 100.0 –
Not employed 4.8 – 100.0 26.0 – 100.0
Working hours per week 36.9 (10.8) 38.7 (7.2) – 22.5 (14.7) 28.6 (10.0) –
Number of observations 5562 5297 265 5562 4383 1179
Table 13 Descriptive statistics: couples with children
Couples men Couples women
All Employed Not employed All Employed Not employed
Lower education 34.0 32.7 55.1 39.0 32.9 57.9
Higher education 66.0 67.3 44.9 61.0 67.1 42.1
No children – – – – – –
Youngest child
0–4years
38.5 38.4 40.1 38.5 39.3 36.0
Youngest child
4–12years
38.7 38.7 39.2 38.7 37.7 42.1
Youngest child
12years
22.8 22.9 20.7 22.8 23.1 21.9
Non-Western
immigrant
12.1 10.0 46.4 11.8 8.6 23.4
Other 87.9 90.0 53.6 88.2 91.4 76.6
Western region 43.9 43.5 50.3 43.9 43.9 44.0
non-Western region 56.1 56.5 49.7 56.1 56.1 56.0
Age 40.5 (6.9) 40.6 (6.9) 40.2 (7.7) 38.1 (6.7) 38.2 (6.6) 37.8 (7.1)
Employed 94.2 100.0 – 68.7 100.0 –
Not employed 5.8 – 100.0 31.3 – 100.0
Working hours
per week
36.7 (11.5) 38.9 (7.2) – 15.7 (11.7) 20.7 (8.8) –
Number of
observations
7980 7521 459 7980 6040 1940
Appendix 3: Estimated Preferences
See Tables 14 and 15.
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X (age/21) −4.419*** −7.921**
X (age/21)2 5.382*** 4.526*
X 1(female) 0.913*** 3.232***
X 1(child 0–3years) – 1.405***
X 1(child 4–11years) – 0.960***
Income2 −0.425*** −1.029**
Leisure2 5.536*** −8.331***
Fixed costs of work −1.730*** −2.664***
X 1(education low) −0.839*** −1.000***
X 1(non-Western immigrant) −1.437*** −1.144***




Negative marginal utility of income 0.0% 0.0%
*Significant at 10% level; **At 5% level and ***at 1% level
Table 15 Estimation results: parameters utility function couples
Couples without children Couples with children
Income −12.380*** −8.319***
Leisure men −42.880 *** −35.480 ***
X (age/21) −11.340 *** −8.008 ***
X (age/21)2 8.899 *** 8.219 ***
X 1(child 0–3years) – 0.898***
X 1(child 4–11years) – 0.806 ***
Leisure women −35.260*** −49.560***
X (age/21) −4.982 *** −6.262***
X (age/21)2 10.850 *** 5.952***
X (child 0–3years) – 0.938 ***
X (child 4–11years) – 1.717***
Income2 3.920 *** 2.903***
Income*leisure men 5.060 *** 3.769 ***
Income*leisure women 2.491*** 1.997 ***
Leisure men2 41.550*** 31.690 ***
Leisure men3 −18.220 ** n.s.
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Table 15 continued
Couples without children Couples with children
Leisure women2 55.580 *** 102.500 ***
Leisure women3 −31.950 *** −61.440 ***
Leisure men*leisure women 0.666 −1.178
Fixed costs of work men −2.393 *** −1.822 ***
X 1(education low) n.s. −0.255 **
X 1(non-Western immigrant) −2.425 *** −1.777 ***
Fixed costs of work women −2.328 *** −2.890 ***
X 1(education low) −0.557 *** −0.669 ***
X 1(non-Western immigrant) −1.060 *** −0.736 ***
X 1(Western region) 0.205 *** 0.110 **
σ1 (men) 6.421 *** 2.112 ***
σ2 (women) 0.019 0.241
Households*alternatives 200,232 287,280
Households 5562 7980
Negative marginal utility of income 0.0% 0.0%
*Significant at 10% level; ** At 5% level and *** at 1% level
Appendix 4: Fit Hours Distribution
Figures 3 and 4 show the fit of themodel for singleswithout children and single parents,
respectively. Both figures show the actual and predicted labour supply distribution,
where the labour supply options are located on the horizontal axis and the vertical
axis indicates their shares (in %). Both figures show that the model predicts the labour
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Fig. 6 Couples with children. a































Table 16 Robustness checks wage elasticities




All All Men Women Men Women
5 discrete choices 0.20 0.29 0.05 0.43 0.11 0.49
Log linear utility function 0.18 0.38 0.06 0.41 0.10 0.51
Quadratic utility function 0.20 0.31 0.08 0.41 0.11 0.64
Fixed costs without
interaction termsa
0.28 0.48 0.08 0.43 0.12 0.50
Less interaction terms
with leisureb
0.19 0.44 0.08 0.44 0.11 0.68
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Table 16 continued




All All Men Women Men Women
Richest fixed costs specificationc 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.38 0.11 0.50
Calibration of the error termsd 0.19 0.27 0.07 0.38 0.11 0.52
Number of Halton
draws/wage draws:
10 draws 0.19 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.12 0.49
30 draws 0.19 0.27 0.07 0.39 0.12 0.49
50 draws (baseline model) 0.19 0.27 0.07 0.39 0.11 0.51
a Only a participation dummy is included
b No interaction terms of age and presence of children with leisure
c Next to education and region, we also include age and the presence of children in the fixed costs specifi-
cation
d By drawing 50 error terms from an extreme value distribution we obtain a perfect match between the
actual and predicted labour supply distribution. These error terms are then used in the scenarios in which
wages are increased
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